

Beyond Functional Convergence: Psychoanalytic Contributions to the Neuroscientific Understanding of Creativity and Singularity

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Abstract

Contemporary neuroscience has made significant advances in describing the biological and functional conditions underlying adaptive behavior, uncertainty reduction, and functional convergence. However, creativity and singularity remain difficult to integrate within models primarily oriented toward regularity, optimization, and stability. This paper develops a psychoanalytic metatheoretical framework for addressing this problem. Consciousness is formalized as a taxonomic logic represented by $P \vee \neg P$, while the unconscious is formalized as a logic of possibility represented by $P \wedge \neg P$. Their coexistence is expressed by the formula $\vdash ((P \vee \neg P) \leftrightarrow (P \wedge \neg P))$, which models the constitutive tension from which singularity and creativity emerge. Singularity is understood as the production of validity, whereas creativity is defined as the production or reinscription of correlations capable of organizing and reorganizing fields of sense. The paper argues that these processes are not exceptional outcomes of otherwise adaptive systems, but constitutive conditions of human experience. Psychoanalytic metatheory thus complements neuroscience by conceptualizing dimensions of mental life that cannot be reduced to adaptation, optimization, or uncertainty reduction.

Keywords: Psychoanalysis, Neuroscience, Creativity, Singularity, Functional Convergence, Unconscious, Metatheory.

Introduction

Creativity and singularity have become increasingly relevant topics within contemporary neuroscience. Advances in neuroimaging, computational modeling, network neuroscience, and predictive processing have considerably expanded our understanding of the biological and functional conditions under which novel behaviors, flexible cognition, and adaptive responses emerge. At the same time, concepts such as uncertainty reduction, free-energy minimization, and functional convergence have provided increasingly sophisticated frameworks for describing the organization of mental activity.

Despite these advances, important conceptual difficulties remain. While contemporary neuroscience can identify neural correlates, characterize large-scale patterns of organization, and describe mechanisms involved in adaptation and cognitive flexibility, the question of how singular forms of organization emerge remains comparatively underdeveloped. Creativity and singularity are frequently approached as exceptional outcomes of otherwise regular processes, yet the conceptual status of both notions often remains unclear.

Psychoanalysis offers a distinct perspective on this problem. Although creativity has never occupied the status of a foundational metapsychological concept, psychoanalytic theory has consistently engaged with phenomena whose defining characteristic is their singularity. Symptoms, dreams, compromise formations,

subjective constructions, and creative productions all point toward modes of organization that cannot be fully exhausted by general regularities alone. For this reason, psychoanalysis constitutes a privileged field from which to examine the relationship between singularity and creativity.

The aim of the present work is not to oppose psychoanalysis to neuroscience, nor to replace biological explanations with psychological ones. Rather, it seeks to explore how a psychoanalytic metatheoretical framework may contribute to contemporary neuroscientific discussions concerning creativity and singularity. To this end, the paper first reviews relevant psychoanalytic and neuroscientific approaches, then develops a metatheoretical account of consciousness and the unconscious as distinct logical organizations, and finally examines singularity and creativity as consequences of their articulation.

From this perspective, the problem is no longer restricted to how biological systems achieve adaptive stability, but also extends to how singular forms of validity and novel correlations emerge within the abstract world inhabited by human beings. It is at this point that a dialogue between neuroscience and psychoanalysis becomes especially relevant, as both fields address complementary aspects of mental life.

The argument developed in this paper proceeds from an additional assumption: that certain limitations encountered in

both psychoanalytic and neuroscientific accounts of creativity and singularity are not exclusively empirical but also conceptual. For this reason, alongside the review of relevant theoretical and neuroscientific approaches, the discussion gradually moves toward a metatheoretical level of analysis, where the logical conditions underlying these phenomena can be examined more explicitly.

Psychoanalytic Approaches to Creativity

Within psychoanalytic theory, the concepts of "singularity" and "creativity" have rarely been explicitly developed, with a few notable exceptions such as Donald Winnicott, Ernst Kris, and Marion Milner. In *Playing and Reality*, Winnicott dedicates an entire chapter to creativity ("Creativity and its Origins"), yet his primary focus remains on the development of transitional phenomena. Indeed, at the very outset of the chapter, he clarifies this position:

"I am hoping that the reader will accept a general reference to creativity, not letting the word get lost in the successful or acclaimed creation but keeping it to the meaning that refers to a colouring of the whole attitude to external reality" [1].

For Winnicott, the origin of creativity is intrinsic to one's attitude toward external reality. Crucially, by framing this as an "attitude," his preliminary argument contrasts creative living with compliance: "It is creative apperception more than anything else that makes the individual feel that life is worth living. Contrasted with this is a relationship to external reality which is one of compliance, the world and its details being recognized but only as something to be fitted in with or demanding adaptation. Compliance carries with it a sense of futility for the individual and is associated with the idea that nothing matters and that life is not worth living" [1].

However, Winnicott ultimately rejects a rigid dichotomy between these two states, as both instances are inherently present at all times:

"...one or other extreme could be expected to be found in any one case or situation" [1].

He deepens this argument by asserting that there is no sharp boundary between objectivity and subjectivity, given that what is perceived as objective is always mediated by subjective conception:

"...objectivity is a relative term because what is objectively perceived is by definition to some extent subjectively conceived of" [1].

Consequently, there can be no absolute differentiation implying a life of total compliance devoid of creativity; creative capacity cannot be completely destroyed:

"There cannot be a complete destruction of a human individual's capacity for creative living and that, even in the most extreme case of compliance and the establishment of a false personality, hidden away somewhere there exists a secret life that is satisfactory because of its being creative or original to that human being" [1].

The implication here is that creativity and compliance are not mutually exclusive conditions, but dimensions that remain dynamically intertwined, much as psychoanalytic theory frequently describes apparently opposed tendencies as coexisting within the same psychic organization. Because the core issue is the subject's relationship to external reality—and given that this externality is never purely objective but always viewed through a subjective perceptual lens—the individual's history cannot be understood in

isolation from their environment:

"...the history of an individual baby cannot be written in terms of the baby alone. It must be written in terms also of the environmental provision which either meets dependence needs or fails to meet them" [1].

In this light, he revisits his work on transitional phenomena, particularly regarding how the environment compensates for the infant's massive loss of intra-uterine omnipotence:

"It is hoped that psychoanalysts will be able to use the theory of transitional phenomena in order to describe the way in which good-enough environmental provision at the very earliest stages makes it possible for the individual to cope with the immense shock of loss of omnipotence" [1].

Within this dynamic, Winnicott locates the source of creativity in the simultaneous elaboration of the self and the surrounding world: "...at this point where creativity either comes into being or does not come into being (or alternatively is lost) the theoretician must take the environment into account, and no statement that concerns the individual as an isolate can touch this central problem of the source of creativity" [1].

Thus, creativity is fundamentally bound to compliance, and compliance at a certain point appears to dictate the absence of creativity. While this seems to introduce a contradiction with his previous claim that creativity cannot be destroyed, the paradox is merely apparent: even under a regime of absolute compliance, creativity is not obliterated; rather, it becomes operative.

Ernst Kris expands upon this investigation into the subject's orientation toward external reality, shifting the analytical focus toward an intrapsychic topography. Rather than evaluating environmental mediation alone, Kris contextualizes creative cognition as a dynamic interplay between the structural agencies of the *Id (Es)* and the *Ego (Ich)*. In *Art and Regression*, he argues that artistic production fundamentally relies on a transient attenuation of executive control, which precipitates a controlled, reversible regression:

"In psychoanalytic terms, this might be formulated as follows: In creating art, the artist is in a state in which the control of the *Ego* is reduced. A regression takes place, but the regression is temporary only, and the *Ego* uses it for its own purposes" [2].

While this regressive maneuver mirrors the structural architecture of psychotic states, non-pathological creative cognition is distinguished by the ultimate re-establishment of executive mastery. Nevertheless, the phenomenological convergence remains striking:

"The insane creates, since the process of production is likely to change, in a magic sense, the world which he depicts or describes. Clearly, this is not a total but only partly an explanation of the phenomenon. I speak with greater assuredness about the second area of research. It concerns unconscious determination of creation in painting and sculpture" [2].

As executive constraints decline during this regressive phase, unconscious determinants acquire greater influence, temporarily loosening the ordinary constraints imposed by the reality principle. This relaxation introduces a process through which established perceptual organizations may be reconfigured, allowing the creative act to dismantle and reorganize previously consolidated forms, wherein each subsequent gesture reincorporates the

disintegrated components into a novel synthesis:

"An image is absorbed by the eye and then reprojected. Creation involves destruction; every stroke simplifies something; but every stroke also is part of a new shape and therefore restitutes and constructs. The degree, to which one, the other, or both of these meanings, destruction and reconstruction, predominate, seems to vary. I do not believe that they are ever totally absent" [2].

Paralleling Winnicott's rejection of linear dualisms, Kris identifies a functional continuity operating between destruction and reconstruction. He formalizes this dynamic by adapting the classical Platonic distinction from the Phaedrus between inspiration and elaboration:

"Schematically speaking we may view the process of artistic-creation as composed of two phases which may be sharply demarcated from each other, may merge into each other, may follow each other in rapid or slow succession, or may be interwoven with each other in various ways. In designating them as inspiration and elaboration, we refer to extreme conditions: One type is characterized by the feeling of being driven, the experience of rapture, and the conviction that an outside agent acts through the creator; in the other type, the experience of purposeful organization, and the intent to solve a problem predominate. The first has many features in common with regressive processes: Impulses and drives, otherwise hidden, emerge. The subjective experience is that of a flow of thought and images driving toward expression. The second has many features in common with what characterizes "work"—dedication and concentration" [3].

Inspiration remains directly coupled with endogenous drive (*Trieb*) vectors, whereas elaboration operates under teleological, task-oriented governance. Viewed through the lens of Freud's classical taxonomy of drive vicissitudes (*Triebschicksale*), this operational circuit may be understood as facilitating processes of psychic discharge and affective regulation:

"At this point we feel finally in a position to formulate a thesis: The shifts in cathexis of mental energy which the work of art elicits or facilitates are, we believe, pleasurable in themselves. From the release of passion under the protection of the aesthetic illusion to the highly complex process of re-creation under the artist's guidance, a series of processes of psychic discharge take place, which could be differentiated from each other by the varieties and degrees of neutralization of the energy discharged. All these processes, however, are controlled by the ego, and the degree of completeness of neutralization indicates the degree of ego autonomy" [3].

Kris hooks this energetic displacement directly to the intrinsic pleasure of neural or psychic operation:

"In assuming that the control of the ego over the discharge of energy is pleasurable in itself, we adopted one of the earliest, and frequently neglected, thoughts of Freud (1905 a) in this area: the suggestion that under certain conditions man may attempt to gain pleasure from the very activity of the psychic apparatus" [3].

Crucially, this framework avoids a reductionist model wherein the *Ego* merely suppresses the *Id*. The creative process relies on a systemic architecture that preserves both differentiation and integration—mirroring the reciprocal co-emergence previously identified in Winnicott:

"In describing developmental functions, child psychology and psychoanalysis use the concept of differentiation and integration.

Differentiation indicates the specialization of a function; integration, the emergence of a new function out of previously not coherent sets of functions or reactions" [4].

To substantiate this non-linear dynamic, Kris challenges the traditional view of a unilateral, chronological divergence of the *Ego* out of a pre-existing *Id*. Instead, he posits a primary, structurally undifferentiated matrix from which both networks co-emerge:

"In introducing his concepts of psychic structure, Freud speaks of a gradual differentiation of the ego from the id; as an end result of this process of differentiation the ego, as a highly structured organization, is opposed to the id. Freud's formulation has obvious disadvantages. It implies that the infant's equipment existing at birth is part of the id. It seems however that the innate apparatus and reflexes cannot all be part of the id, in the sense generally accepted in psychoanalysis. We suggest a different assumption, namely that of an undifferentiated phase during which both the id and the ego gradually are formed" [4].

The epistemological value of this co-emergent model lies in its definition of ipseity and alterity. If the *Ego* manages the reality principle and the *Id* acts as the endogenous energetic reservoir, their structural alignment establishes a strict *Wechselwirkung*—a reciprocal interaction that preserves the distinct identity of both instances while simultaneously binding them in a complementary functionality:

"In order to explain the earliest processes of differentiation and integration, we turn to the study of phenomena that we attribute to regression to these stages" [4].

Ultimately, it is precisely this non-pathological, highly organized regression that defines the operational boundary of creativity, according to Kris.

A structurally similar formulation regarding this complex, non-pathological negotiation with reality is articulated by Marion Milner in *On Not Being Able to Paint*. For Milner, the resolution of this problematic relationship does not entail an acquisitive forage into the external world; rather, it hinges entirely upon an internal impetus to surrender and deliver:

"...still another aspect of the creative synthesis between subject and object. It was to do, not so much with the problem of what one seeks to find in the external world, but with what one seeks to give" [5].

This framework introduces a paradoxical conception of the relationship between self and other: the creative act simultaneously executes an appropriation of the world—which is fundamentally transfigured in the process—while concurrently restituting and safeguarding the world's autonomous identity:

"To be able to break down the barrier of space between self and other, yet at the same time to be able to maintain it, this seems to be the paradox of creativity" [5].

This subjective fabrication of the world expands far beyond mere material manipulation. For Milner, the creative act transforms material experience into symbolic and representational forms; every creative gesture operates as a symbolic abstraction designed to orchestrate order out of chaos:

"...psychic creativeness is the capacity for making a symbol. Thus, creativeness in the arts is making a symbol for feeling and creativeness in science is making a symbol for knowing" [5].

What permits this systematic taxonomy is precisely the symbolization of the material matrix. For Milner, however, the formal, logical dimensions of this symbolic conversion are subsidiary to the primary, pre-logical baseline that precedes it: "...the logical terms in which the capacity for symbol formation is thought about are perhaps less important than the pre-logical. I want to suggest that it is the terms in which we think, on the deeper non-verbal levels of the psyche, about this specifically human capacity for making symbols that in part determines the way the capacity works in us" [5].

This intrinsic capacity for symbol formation bears a strong resemblance to what Freud described in *Die Traumdeutung* as representability (*Darstellbarkeit*)—the foundational, structural substrate that underwrites the subsequent linguistic translation of the dream via the unconscious mechanisms of condensation (*Verdichtung*). Milner expands this concept, treating it as an inherent aspect of all linguistic and symbolic expression. In this sense, the structural use of language itself demands a creative relationship characterized by the abstract appropriation of reality: "...a number of states of mind that are different from everyday conscious awareness may be in part an expression of the unconscious or half-conscious need to give this creativeness its freedom; they may be in part distorted forms of an essential and normal phenomenon" [5].

Consequently, a continuous dual state remains operational: a synchronous tension between conscious and unconscious registers. This duality underpins the aforementioned paradox: the preservation of the object's identity is inextricably bound to its structural loss during symbolic appropriation, and the work of the psychic apparatus is to simultaneously preserve and suspend this paradox:

"In psycho-analytic terms this process of seeking to preserve experiences can certainly be described in terms of the unconscious attempt to preserve, recreate, restore the lost object" [5].

Preserving experience through unconscious processes challenges a straightforward application of the classical principle of the excluded middle (*tertium non datur*). As Freud established in *Das Unbewusste*, the primary unconscious process is fundamentally characterized by an absence of negation (*Widerspruchlos*), which must be understood specifically as the categorical absence of contradiction, rather than a mere failure to contradict. Thus, Milner's conception of preserving experience cannot be understood as a symmetrical or mimetic reproduction; it is a recreation driven by radical abstraction. It is not the material object that is duplicated, but the specific structural logic governing its reproduction, neatly encapsulated within the signifier.

Milner maps this convergence of dual logical regimes directly onto the artwork—an architecture that can be extended to all creative innovation. On one side operates the binary, conscious domain governed by the principle of non-contradiction, which remains functionally optimized for navigating the inanimate environment: "We know a lot about the first kind of thinking, we know its basis in the primary laws of logic, which say that a thing is what it is and not what it is not, that it cannot both be and not be. We know also that these laws of reasoning work very well for managing the inanimate material environment" [5].

Yet, within the interior life of symbolic appropriation, this binary

matrix proves entirely insufficient. Unchecked by the structural boundaries of the reality principle, its absolute dominance effectively paralyzes creative ideation. Here emerges the domain of representability (*Darstellbarkeit*), a regime that the binary logic of waking consciousness invariably dismisses as irrational: "...according to formal logic, all thought which does not make the total separation between what a thing is and what it is not is irrational; but then the whole area of symbolic expression is irrational, since the point about a symbol is that it is both itself and something else" [5].

At this exact juncture, Milner locates the operational core of the creative act. It is a bidirectional, mutually determining movement—a rigorous *Wechselwirkung* where the boundary between "me" and "not-me" is imposed at the very moment it is structurally dissolved:

"...the great difficulty in thinking logically about this problem is due to the fact that we are trying to talk about a process which stops being that process as soon as we talk about it, trying to talk about a state in which the 'me-not-me' distinction is not important, but to do so at all we have to make the distinction. But it is only, I think, in this way of looking at it that the phrase 'art creates nature' can make sense. So what the artist, or perhaps one should say, the great innovator in art, is doing, fundamentally, is not recreating in the sense of making again what has been lost (although he is doing this), but creating what is, because he is creating the power to perceive it. By continually breaking up the established familiar patterns (familiar in his particular culture and time in history) of logical common sense divisions of me-not-me, he really is creating 'nature', including human nature" [5].

Ultimately, for Milner, this operates as an unceasing, homeostatic loop of structural destruction and symbolic elaboration:

"[the artist] does this by unmasking old symbols and making new ones, thus incidentally making it possible for us to see that the old symbol was a symbol; whereas before we thought the symbol was a 'real-ity' because we had nothing else to compare it with. In this sense he is continually destroying 'nature' and re-creating nature" [5].

Creativity, Reality and Compromise Formation

Consequently, even though creativity has traditionally eluded categorization as a foundational concept within classical psychoanalytic theory, these three authors present a distinct psychoanalytic approach. Dominated by a shared theoretical thread, Winnicott, Kris, and Milner collectively define creativity as a subjective coloring of objective reality, which operates as an expansion of the psychoanalytic scope regarding the reality principle (*Realitätsprinzip*). From a dynamic viewpoint, this process manifests as a structural transformation where the Ego, unable to process reality as is, allows endogenous drive vectors to color it, thereby establishing a new subjective status. This mechanism aligns with the implicit distinction introduced by Freud, who reserved the term *Realität* for objective reality, while employing *Wirklichkeit* to denote an effective reality—one structurally altered by unconscious forces and the economy of the drives. On an epistemological and aesthetic level, creativity operates as a paradoxical synthesis that shifts the vector of determination: within the symbolic, creative, or aesthetic act, it is objective reality that is determined by the subject, rather than the individual being determined by reality.

Crucially, all three authors challenge rigid binary oppositions.

Winnicott questions the notion of pure objectivity, Kris emphasizes the dynamic interaction between *Id* and *Ego*, and Milner problematizes the strict distinction between "me" and "not-me". This non-pathological negotiation with reality invokes a baseline where creation and destruction exist in perpetual continuity: Winnicott locates this loop within the structural collapse of primary omnipotence, Kris explicitly asserts that creation is fundamentally bound to destruction, and Milner concludes that the innovator operates in an unceasing cycle of destroying and recreating nature. Ultimately, for this triad, the creative process constitutes an intrinsic, vital operation of the psychic apparatus, indispensable for absorbing the traumatic shock of the reality principle, transforming raw *Realität* into an effective, psychically operational *Wirklichkeit*.

Their theoretical divergence lies not in the underlying logic of this phenomenon, but rather in the specific conceptual architectures they recruit to map its boundaries. Winnicott anchors his model in ontogeny and primary environmental provision, positioning the maternal-infant matrix as the definitive catalyst for experiential grounding. Kris leans heavily on economic dynamics, cathexis, and drive energetics to contrast the extreme conditions of inspiration and elaboration. Milner, by contrast, operates on an epistemological register, interrogating the structure of language and the boundaries of formal logic. Underlying these diverse perspectives is a common theme: the constant mediation between external reality and intrapsychic life—or between drive pressures and the reality principle (*Realitätsprinzip*)—closely resembles what psychoanalysis conceptualizes through the notion of symptom formation (*Symptombildung*). From the perspective developed here, the creative act may be understood as a paradigmatic example of symptom formation, or more broadly, as a prototype of compromise formation (*Kompromißbildung*). Importantly, this psychoanalytic mechanism of mediation admits a productive comparison with several contemporary neuroscientific models of large-scale brain function. What psychoanalysis conceptualizes as the economic tension involved in compromise formation can be compared, at a metatheoretical level, with the tensions described in models such as the free-energy principle and the entropic brain framework. From the perspective adopted here, a formal parallel can be drawn between the psychoanalytic tension linking *Id* and *Ego* and the interaction between bottom-up affective and motivational processes and top-down predictive constraints described in contemporary predictive-processing frameworks. At least at this level of description, both paradigms appear to converge on a common emphasis: the regulation of uncertainty as a central organizing principle.

Free Energy, Homeostasis, and the Neurobiological Boundary of the Self

Winnicott conceptualizes the boundary separating the "me" from the "not-me" in strictly ontological terms. From the baseline of the infant's primary helplessness—where crying operates as the solitary tool for survival—this foundational division is structurally forged through frustration; yet, it remains a fundamentally ontological perspective insofar as the definition of Being is necessarily determined in relation to a contrasting Non-Being. In direct contradistinction, Friston shifts this boundary from an ontological framing to one of systemic self-organization, mapping it onto the mathematical concept of the *Markov blanket*:

"life—or biological self-organization—is an inevitable and emergent property of any (ergodic) random dynamical system that possesses a Markov blanket" [6].

Thus, for Friston, the biological origin of individuation is inextricably bound to an organism's capacity to resist entropy, which is formally operationalized as the minimization of variational free energy:

"...systems that do not minimize free energy cannot exist, because the entropy of their sensory states would not be bounded and would increase indefinitely—by the fluctuation theorem. Therefore, biological systems must minimize free energy" [6].

On one hand, this model highlights a central principle regarding biological organization: viable self-maintaining systems require a degree of internal order that allows them to resist the dispersive tendencies associated with entropy. By preempting chaos through structural organization, the biological system successfully minimizes its free energy. When extended to mental processes, this framework suggests that neural organization reduces uncertainty through the stabilization of predictive relations within the organism's interactions with its environment. Concurrently, this process converges with the fundamental biological principle of homeostasis:

"In other words, the very existence of biological systems necessarily implies they will adapt and evolve. This is meant in the sense that any system with a random dynamical attractor will appear to minimize its variational free energy and can be interpreted as engaging in active inference—acting upon its external milieu to maintain an internal homeostasis" [6].

This foundational model, through which Friston describes the minimal baseline requirement of any living organism—namely, *life as we know it*—directly scales up to the macroscale cerebral functions of evolutionarily advanced organisms, most notably humans. The minimization of free energy is a mandatory imperative across all biological systems:

"...free energy minimisation is mandatory in biological systems" [7].

Furthermore, empirical observations of cerebral activity under conditions of uncertainty allow Friston to conclude that a strict correlation exists between the brain's hierarchical architecture and the ongoing minimization of free energy:

"...[These results are] consistent with the recurrent dynamics entailed by the hierarchical formulation of generative models in the brain and the inversion of these models in accord with the free energy principle" [7].

Consequently, when applied to the hierarchical predictive coding of human brain function, this computational model clarifies an essential operational principle of the mind: the reduction of uncertainty functions as an energetic mechanism to preserve homeostatic equilibrium via the minimization of free energy:

"...systems with a low free energy will be selected over systems with a higher free energy. The free energy rests on a specification of a generative model, which is entailed by the organism's structure. Identifying this model enables one to predict how a system will change if it conforms to the free energy principle. For the brain, a plausible model is a hierarchical dynamic system in which neural activity encodes the conditional modes of environmental states and its connectivity encodes the causal context in which these states evolve" [7].

In contrast to the object-relational focus characteristic of psychoanalysis, Friston's formulation implies that the architecture

of individuation is primarily driven by an intrinsic thermodynamic necessity. Within this computational framework, the stabilization of an organic boundary and the emergence of an organized unity operate as biophysical conditions rather than symbolic negotiations, delineating what may be understood as a proto-self.

Entropy, Primary Consciousness, and the Anarchic Brain

Robin Carhart-Harris introduces an important modification to this thermodynamic framework by proposing that variations in brain entropy play a central role in shaping different states of consciousness. In *The Entropic Brain* (2014) and its subsequent expansion, *The Entropic Brain Revisited* (2018), Carhart-Harris posits that the quality of any given conscious state depends fundamentally on the degree of entropy—defined as uncertainty, complexity, and unpredictability—inherent to spontaneous brain activity. While the 2014 iteration formulated this dynamic by utilizing the psychedelic state as a model for a "primary state" of consciousness, the 2018 framework leveraged greater empirical evidence to offer increased precision: cerebral entropy indexes the informational richness of consciousness, but only within strict boundary parameters, as exceeding a critical threshold results in the dissolution of consciousness itself:

"At its core, the entropic brain hypothesis proposes that the quality of any conscious state depends on the system's entropy measured via key parameters of brain function. Entropy is a powerful explanatory tool for cognitive neuroscience since it provides a quantitative index of a dynamic system's randomness or disorder while simultaneously describing its informational character, i.e., our uncertainty about the system's state if we were to sample it at any given time-point" [8].

"The entropic brain hypothesis proposes that within upper and lower limits, after which consciousness may be lost, the entropy of spontaneous brain activity indexes the informational richness of conscious states" [9].

Carhart-Harris appropriates specific Freudian concepts and maps them directly onto Karl Friston's free-energy principle. He notes that within Freudian metapsychology, the *Ego* is structurally defined by its capacity to delineate the boundaries of the self relative to the not-self:

"We focus on the ego because it is one of Freud's less abstract constructs and it is hypothesized that its disintegration is necessary for the occurrence of primary states. The ego can be defined as a sensation of possessing an immutable identity or personality; most simply, the ego is our "sense of self." Importantly however, in Freudian metapsychology, the ego is not just a (high-level) sensation of self-hood; it is a fundamental system that works in competition and cooperation with other processes in the mind to determine the quality of consciousness. It is because Freud described "the ego" in this mechanistic sense that it can be considered a useful complement to the more widely used concept of "the self." Effectively, the terms "ego" and "self" are synonyms, except that "the ego" has a background in Freudian metapsychology" [8].

Through this synthesis, Carhart-Harris subtly shifts Friston's emphasis from a purely biological constraint to an intrapsychic architecture. Rather than contradicting the free-energy principle, he nuances its parameters: the mandatory biological imperative is no longer the absolute minimization of entropy, but rather its homeostatic containment within a critical threshold. To ground this mechanism, Carhart-Harris resurrects the Freudian

taxonomy of the primary process (*Primärvorgang*)—characterized by representability (*Darstellung*)—and the secondary process (*Sekundärvorgang*), governed by representation (*Vorstellung*). He adapts this intrapsychic dichotomy to differentiate between a primary and a secondary mode of consciousness:

"The style of cognition that is dominant in normal waking consciousness will henceforth be referred to as secondary consciousness and the (pre-ego) style of cognition that is associated with primitive states will be referred to as primary consciousness" [8].

Consequently, the regulation of entropy becomes closely associated with the operations of secondary consciousness:

"Consistent with Karl Friston's free-energy principle (Friston, 2010), this article takes the view that the mind has evolved (via secondary consciousness upheld by the ego) to process the environment as precisely as possible by finessing its representations of the world so that surprise and uncertainty (i.e., entropy) are minimized" [8].

With this conceptual modification, Carhart-Harris relativizes the strictly defensive homeostatic function of the brain by demonstrating that pre-ego primary consciousness preserves a localized threshold of chaos. This chaotic baseline manifests as structural uncertainty, as well as endogenous wishes or terrors by which the mind is easily misled. Waking secondary consciousness, conversely, is characterized by its rigorous alignment with the reality principle (*Realitätsprinzip*), optimizing the precise representation of the external world:

"...a key distinction between the primary and secondary modes of cognition is that secondary consciousness pays deference to reality and diligently seeks to represent the world as precisely as possible, whereas primary consciousness is less firmly anchored to reality and is easily misled by simple explanations motivated by wishes and fears" [8].

Carhart-Harris explicitly correlates this primary consciousness with the Id or the systemic unconscious. In 2019, Carhart-Harris and Friston unified the free-energy principle and the entropic brain hypothesis into a singular framework: the REBUS (*RELaxed Beliefs Under pSYchedelics*) and the Anarchic Brain model. Using psychopharmacological induction as an experimental baseline, the authors demonstrate that an "anarchic brain" state emerges when high-level priors—the structural constraints of secondary consciousness—are relaxed. As a result, suppressed unconscious material becomes accessible to conscious awareness:

"We propose that the REBUS/anarchic brain model can explain the full gamut of phenomena associated with the psychedelic experience, including the emergence of previously unconscious psychological material into conscious awareness" [10].

In a critical footnote, the authors qualify this mechanism, echoing Freud's mature rejection of a simplistic "uncovering" of hidden topographies. The phenomenon does not entail the romantic revelation of an occulted object, but rather the operational persistence of unconscious impulses driving conscious behavior. Although not explicitly named, the structural architecture of the drives (*Triebe*) resonates powerfully within this definition:

"...we adopt the position that much of the mind is indeed unconscious and what is kept from conscious awareness can be personal and collective as well as "once conscious—but now repressed" or simply "never conscious." We also maintain the unconscious often (but not always) drives conscious behavior in

the absence of conscious awareness, in the way that a horse can steer its rider, without the rider realizing" [10].

The "anarchic brain" principle operates as the natural counterpart to this relaxation of beliefs, functioning as an intrinsic neurobiological mechanism independent of exogenous pharmacological agents: "The anarchic brain principle is a natural counterpart to relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS). This is because the relaxation of high-level priors necessarily implies a liberation of bottom-up information flow (particularly from intrinsic sources)" [10].

At this point, an interesting parallel can be drawn with Kris's account of creativity as emerging from a controlled tension between different psychic tendencies. For Carhart-Harris and Friston, the relaxation of high-level priors may facilitate the emergence of novel patterns of association and conceptual organization. While this can be interpreted in Fristonian terms as a roundabout strategy to reduce long-term uncertainty, a deeper reading reveals that uncertainty remains structurally inherent to the process, establishing a baseline tension that can neither be resolved nor canceled:

"It is widely recognized in literature on creativity that insight often occurs as part of a process, the initial phase of which involves an intention or plan, e.g., to discover something new. One heuristic for doing this is to relax one's confidence in one's prior assumptions (i.e., high-level priors), and, in so doing, promote an open, inquiring state of mind. This approach is essentially epistemic in nature, i.e., it is a behavioral strategy intended for learning, under the assumption that there is something to be learnt, i.e., there is some expected uncertainty" [10].

The authors attempt to resolve this teleological dilemma, albeit through a conceptually loose compromise:

"More than this, however, the knowledge seeker hopes to learn in an optimal way, e.g., learning as much as possible, with the least amount of effort. He/She does this by sampling areas where this is an opportunity to resolve a lot of uncertainty, i.e., where there is a lot to be learnt" [10].

At this precise juncture, the framework uncovers an unmistakable operational symmetry with Kris's thesis: creativity as the product of a controlled intrapsychic conflict. For Carhart-Harris and Friston, the relaxation of high-level priors liberates thought patterns, steering them toward novel conceptual configurations. This mechanism also establishes a direct convergence with Milner's formulation regarding the semantic ambiguity of the artistic symbol and its grounding in primary consciousness. However, a crucial divergence emerges in how secondary consciousness is conceptualized: whereas Milner posits this symbolic ambiguity as an intrinsic, non-pathological dimension of the psyche—embracing its "irrationality" not as a structural failure but as an inherent human capacity—the Fristonian paradigm treats such chaos as a state that must ultimately be reduced. Carhart-Harris attempts to salvage this tension through the construct of the "anarchic brain," presenting a neural substrate that remains structurally ungovernable by formal reason alone.

Nevertheless, the relationship between the anarchic dimension of the model and its broader homeostatic commitments raises an important conceptual question: conceiving the brain as simultaneously dependent upon entropy-generating and entropy-constraining processes may create a tension that remains theoretically unresolved. According to their own postulate of

uncertainty reduction, the very architecture of their theoretical elaboration compels them to sustain the existence of this tension rather than resolve it. While it could be argued that this paradox merely marks the current frontier of cognitive neuroscience—leaving the question open as an empirical interrogative—the epistemological problem may run deeper. Science has advanced along a specific vector that systematically prevents it from reducing this uncertainty, precisely because it has failed to comprehend its structural necessity. By anchoring their models to traditional assumptions of pure reason and biological homeostasis, contemporary theories impose a "preferable" evolutionary orientation over what is a structurally and logically valid operational state of the apparatus.

Uncertainty Reduction and Its Limits

This teleological orientation becomes particularly visible in theories that place uncertainty reduction at the center of biological and cognitive organization, often linking it to broader notions of homeostasis and adaptive regulation. In *Uncertainty, epistemics and active inference*, Parr and Friston formalize the computational parameters of uncertainty. Although the article does not explicitly focus on classical notions of homeostasis, its framework remains grounded in the free-energy principle, from which the emphasis on uncertainty reduction derives. While the "anarchic brain" hypothesis offers one way of addressing this tension, it leaves open deeper questions concerning the nature and status of uncertainty itself. After evaluating multiple anatomical and physiological scales, the authors explicitly couple uncertainty with exploratory behavior within their discussion:

"Through their influence on salience—a component of the expected free energy of a policy—uncertainty can have a profound influence on epistemic behaviour" [11].

To ground this operational framework, they formulate a strict taxonomy of generic uncertainties designed to map specific cerebral regions to their corresponding neural activations:

"...there are three fundamental sorts of beliefs that determine behaviour: (i) beliefs about outcomes given hidden or latent states of the world, (ii) beliefs about states of the world, and (iii) beliefs about policies given states of the world. Each of these sets of beliefs is equipped with an uncertainty or precision that may be encoded by specific modulatory neurotransmitter systems" [11]. Within this context, the authors revisit the classical "dark-room paradox," a theoretical challenge which posits that if the supreme biological imperative were the absolute reduction of uncertainty, an organism should simply remain in a stimulus-free, dark corner indefinitely. At first glance, this paradox appears to challenge the logic of uncertainty reduction. The paradox highlights the need to clarify how uncertainty reduction should be understood when applied to living organisms operating in complex and changing environments:

"Organisms that succeed, the free energy principle mandates, do so by minimizing their tendency to enter into this special kind of surprising (that is, non-anticipated) state. But at first sight this principle seems bizarre. Animals do not simply find a dark corner and stay there. Play and exploration are core features of many life-forms" [12].

This argument is structurally deceptive; organisms cannot survive without active foraging or reproduction, rendering the dark-room scenario a biological impossibility. Nonetheless, the dilemma serves as a conceptual foil for the authors to define the precise scope of uncertainty reduction:

"Avoiding surprises means that one has to model and anticipate a

changing and itinerant world. This implies that the models used to quantify surprise must themselves embody itinerant wandering through sensory states (because they have been selected by exposure to an inconstant world): Under the free-energy principle, the agent will become an optimal (if approximate) model of its environment. This is because, mathematically, surprise is also the negative log-evidence for the model entailed by the agent. This means minimizing surprise maximizes the evidence for the agent (model). Put simply, the agent becomes a model of the environment in which it is immersed" [12].

Consequently, the reduction of uncertainty does not precipitate absolute stasis, but rather predictable exploration, viable action, inferential perception, and the homeostatic or allostatic conservation of the organism. In short, the brain does not seek literal darkness; it seeks a world it can actively anticipate, inhabit, and regulate:

"The free-energy principle says that we harvest sensory signals that we can predict (cf., emulation theory; Grush, 2004); ensuring we keep to well-trodden paths in the space of all the physical and physiological variables that underwrite our existence" [12].

From the perspective developed in this paper, these formulations also reveal an underlying preference for cognitive states associated with greater predictability and reduced uncertainty:

"Heuristically, this is why a well-lit room, with precise sensory information, is preferable to a dark room; i.e. precise sensory cues that resolve ambiguity have greater epistemic affordance and are more likely to be sampled" [11].

Functional Convergence and the Problem of Neural Predictability

Through this mapping of neural networks, the authors attempt to optimize the mechanics of free-energy reduction. However, this approach encounters this approach also encounters important limitations, as demonstrated by Stefano Fusi, Earl K. Miller, and Mattia Rigotti in *Why neurons mix: high dimensionality for higher cognition*. The authors argue that even when mapping specific neural networks, predicting individual responses to isolated variables remains impossible due to the radical impact of context: "Mixed selectivity neurons are selectively activated by combinations of different task variables that cannot be predicted by their responses to individual variables. These neuronal responses are actually repeatable: the neurons behave the same way in the same context, but their selectivity is highly context-dependent. As a consequence, the activity of any individual mixed selectivity neuron doesn't mean anything by itself" [13].

Furthermore, they reinforce this unpredictability by factoring in an unrepeatable component of neural activation labeled as "noise": "Diversity and non-linear mixed selectivity are essential ingredients, but they might not be sufficient when noise is factored in. Noise can be defined as the component of the neuronal response that is not reproducible, as, for example, the fluctuations of the neural activity across different trials that correspond to repetitions of the same experimental condition. Because of noise, in any realistic situations the points in Figure should actually be replaced by clouds of points, where each cloud represents the trial-to-trial distribution of the neural activity in a specific condition. Noise can introduce activity components that cause an increase in dimensionality. However because of their non-repeatability, these components cannot be useful for coding and discriminate response vectors across conditions" [13].

Read through this lens, a component of uncertainty appears to remain intrinsic to cerebral function, suggesting that standardized mappings of neural networks may not be sufficient to fully account for the variability of cognitive and behavioral responses.

Creativity in Contemporary Neuroscience

This biological limitation directly complicates the definition of creativity within contemporary neuroscience. Historically, Guilford conceptualized creativity as a specific constellation of cognitive abilities configured to generate novel and potentially acceptable responses, focusing heavily on individual differences, mental operations, and personality traits:

"Whether or not the individual who has the requisite abilities will actually produce results of a creative nature will depend upon his motivational and temperamental traits" [14].

"The creative person has novel ideas. The degree of novelty of which the person is capable, or which he habitually exhibits, is pertinent to our study. This can be tested in terms of the frequency of uncommon, yet acceptable, responses to items" [14].

Aligning closely with this foundation, Mark A. Runco and Garrett J. Jaeger refined this definition in *The Standard Definition of Creativity*, arguing that originality alone is insufficient, since novel ideas may also be ineffective or irrelevant:

"Originality is vital for creativity but is not sufficient. Ideas and products that are merely original might very well be useless" [15].

To rectify this, they argue that creativity requires a dual parameter of originality and effectiveness, reinterpreting Guilford's framework to support this standard definition:

"Guilford seemed to be assuming that creativity requires originality and effectiveness. He used the terms realistic and acceptable for the latter, which is slightly problematic, but still he was thinking about creativity in a fashion that is entirely consistent with the standard definition" [15].

However, replacing Guilford's "acceptable" with "effectiveness" introduces an equivalent degree of ambiguity, as they define it as follows:

"Original things must be effective to be creative. Like originality, effectiveness takes various forms. It may take the form of (and be labeled as) usefulness, fit, or appropriateness" [15].

Anna Abraham previously highlighted some limitations of predominantly behavioral approaches in *The promises and perils of the neuroscience of creativity*, warning that creative cognition cannot be reduced to predictable responses elicited by standardized tasks:

"The unfortunate truth is that one is particularly dependent on behavioral responses in creativity tasks because the stimulus event or task cue does not automatically evoke the necessary cognitive processes under study. Creativity cannot simply be prompted in a manner that is reliable or valid" [16].

Roger Beaty and colleagues further refine this empirical exploration in *Robust prediction of individual creative ability from brain functional connectivity*, proposing that individual creative capacity—quantified via divergent thinking tasks—can be robustly predicted from a highly specific profile of whole-brain functional connectivity. Their central thesis posits that highly

creative individuals do not rely on an isolated cerebral region, but rather utilize the coordinated coactivation of three major systems: the default mode network (DMN), the executive control network (ECN), and the salience network (SN). Having established key functional parameters—namely, that creativity is operationalized through divergent thinking, rejects localized confinement to a single region, and requires the continuous generation, selection, and evaluation of ideas—they constructed the "creative connectome," a large-scale neural network architecture underlying creative cognition:

"we aimed to uncover a "creative connectome"—a whole-brain network associated with creative thinking ability—and conduct a leave-one-out cross-validation analysis (i.e., internal validation) to test whether the strength of functional connectivity within this network can reliably predict creative ability in novel participants within this dataset" [17].

Consequently, they conclude that individual differences in creative thinking ability can be predicted from patterns of large-scale functional connectivity:

"the findings provide evidence that creative thinking ability can be reliably predicted from an individual's unique brain connectivity profile" [17].

Nevertheless, the authors carefully relativize their conclusions, acknowledging the intrinsic complexity that characterizes the very construct of creativity:

"Creativity remains a complex construct that will require considerable further research to uncover its many manifestations in the brain. Unlike some aspects of cognition that have been reliably localized to specific brain regions, complex constructs such as creativity are likely a product of similarly complex neural mechanisms that engage the whole brain" [17].

A year later, Roger E. Beaty, Paul Seli, and Daniel L. Schacter revisited this predictive framework in *Network neuroscience of creative cognition: mapping cognitive mechanisms and individual differences in the creative brain*. Here, they explicitly question the predictive value of correlating neural network synchronization with creative capacity, admitting that the available evidence remains overwhelmingly correlational. Stated plainly, it remains unclear whether these patterns of functional connectivity play a causal role in creative performance or primarily reflect neural processes that accompany it:

"research has thus far largely relied on correlational methods, so it is unclear whether connectivity patterns are causally related to creative performance" [18].

The Epistemological Deadlock: Conceptual Vagueness and Reductive Teleology

Thus, contemporary neuroscience faces two persistent challenges: on the one hand, defining creativity in a theoretically precise manner; on the other, explaining the mechanisms through which creative processes emerge and operate. These difficulties suggest that further progress may depend not only on additional empirical findings, but also on a more precise formulation of the problem itself.

Both psychoanalytic theory and contemporary systems neuroscience encounter distinct conceptual difficulties when formulating the dynamics of the psychic apparatus and the mind. In the case of psychoanalysis, the primary epistemic difficulty stems from the fact that its conceptual developments—including Freudian metapsychology—remain anchored to a predominantly

descriptive substrate, rendering its core concepts relatively vague. For instance, when analyzing the unconscious, the literature frequently oscillates between treating it as an operational attribute (*what is unconscious*) rather than a localized structural system (*the unconscious*). While it is true that in the original German, *das Unbewusste* employs the neutral article *das*—which allows for a dual reading as either a dynamic becoming (*lo inconsciente*) or a substantial entity (*el inconsciente*)—and the capitalization of *Unbewusste* designates it as a noun rather than an adjective, the construct is still structurally approached as an extensive ensemble defined by its manifest components, rather than an intensive network defined by its internal logical properties. Conversely, neuroscience is often developed within biological and mechanistic frameworks that, while highly successful in many domains, may encounter difficulties when addressing phenomena such as creativity and singularity. In this context, explanatory models centered primarily on adaptation, optimization, and uncertainty reduction may leave unresolved important questions concerning the emergence of novelty, creativity, and singular forms of organization. The phenomena of singularity and creativity constitute a particularly revealing boundary for both disciplines. Psychoanalysis offers a rich account of subjective formations but often relies on concepts that remain difficult to define with precision, whereas neuroscience provides increasingly sophisticated models of biological and cognitive organization while leaving open important questions concerning the emergence of singular forms of organization and creative production.

If these difficulties are not exclusively empirical but also conceptual, then a complementary level of analysis becomes necessary. The following discussion therefore shifts from the description of mental phenomena to the formal conditions that may underlie them.

The Psychoanalytic Metatheoretical Framework

To systematically address this deadlock, it is first necessary to re-examine the foundational nature of mental processes: the classic mind-body problem (or, more radically, the matter-thought threshold). From the metatheoretical perspective developed here, this problem can be approached not primarily as a physiological or intrapsychic question, but as a logical one. At this juncture, an immediate objection arises: to frame the mind-body threshold as a logical problem assumes that the translation from matter to thought has already taken place, thereby rendering the argument circular—it begs the question. While this objection identifies a genuine difficulty, it does not invalidate the methodological strategy adopted here. By treating this threshold as a logical problem, the aim is to construct a metatheoretical reconstruction capable of clarifying the conditions that underlie subsequent conceptual models. The rationale for this approach will become clearer in the following sections, where the material domain is modeled as an undifferentiated continuum that does not yet explicitly incorporate identity or alterity. Consequently, adopting an abstract, formal perspective is an absolute methodological necessity. Crucially, this does not imply that classical formal logic is inadequate for the task. On the contrary, even within its traditional restrictions, it can be used to model both the material continuum and the emergence of biological and abstract forms of organization.

The Material Continuum

The metatheoretical baseline proposed in this work aims to provide a formal framework to comprehend with greater precision the

model under which the mind operates. Before addressing the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, as well as the problems of singularity and creativity, it is necessary to establish a more elemental starting point: determining what distinguishes the living from the inert.

This question is not formulated here in physical, chemical, or biological terms, but from a strictly logical perspective. This does not imply disregarding the contributions of those disciplines or substituting their empirical explanations. The objective is different. It consists of identifying the minimal formal relations whose emergence allows for the distinction between an inert condition and a living condition. This distinction constitutes the foundation upon which more complex configurations linked to mental functioning can subsequently be developed. *This proposal should therefore be understood as a metatheoretical abstraction rather than as a physical or biological theory of matter and life.*

As a working hypothesis, it is proposed that the inert can be modeled as a material continuity. This formulation does not intend to exhaustively describe matter or replace currently available scientific models. Its function is more circumscribed: to provide a formal representation of a condition in which the notions of identity, difference, boundary, and temporality have not yet been explicitly introduced.

The immediate objection is obvious. Matter exhibits observable differences. A mountain is not a river, and a rock is not an organism. However, all such distinctions presuppose a framework that already permits identifying entities, establishing properties, and fixing boundaries. The question of interest here is more elemental: what occurs if such differentiating operations are provisionally suspended, and we consider solely the material continuity upon which these extractions are subsequently made?

From a metatheoretical perspective, the problem can be formulated in terms of exteriority. All differentiation requires a criterion capable of establishing a distinction; stated otherwise, it requires a reference with respect to which something can appear as different from something else. When that reference is absent, matter ceases to present itself as an ensemble of discrete entities and can be conceived as a continuity without explicit partitions.

In this sense, and following a previous development, it is possible to conceive an absolute empirical context as a condition in which there is no external instance capable of introducing a transcendent reference:

“En un contexto empírico absoluto —es decir, uno en el que no hay instancia externa ni punto de referencia trascendente—, la materia se concibe como estrictamente continua” [19].

With this purpose, the formula is proposed:

$P \rightarrow P$

The choice of this expression responds to methodological reasons. It is not argued that matter literally possesses the form of a logical implication. The formula constitutes a formal model whose function consists in representing a condition in which an explicit difference does not yet appear. P is a necessary and sufficient condition for P . No alternative term or negation is introduced. The expression preserves solely the reiteration of the same term.

Naturally, this representation is not without its difficulties. $P \rightarrow P$ remains a logical formula and, therefore, presupposes a

relationship between antecedent and consequent. In a strict sense, this implies a minimal differentiation. However, this limitation is inevitable. All formalization requires establishing relationships, and all representation demands introducing distinctions. For this reason, the formula should not be understood as an exact description of material continuity, but as the simplest logical representation of a condition regarding which differences have not yet been formally incorporated.

Furthermore, its choice possesses a decisive advantage. It allows for the establishment of formal continuity with the condition that characterizes life.

Life as the Introduction of Alterity

Life can be defined, in its broadest sense, as the emergence of an alternative:

“La vida, en su sentido más amplio, es opción” [19].

The importance of this definition lies in the fact that it introduces a fundamental difference with respect to material continuity. While the latter remains constant, life incorporates the possibility of more than one value. The living can be preserved or lost, persist or become extinct. In general terms, it introduces an alternative where previously only continuity had been represented.

From a formal point of view, this condition can be modeled by:
 $P \vee \neg P$

The formula must not be interpreted as an intellectual operation or as a conscious activity. Its function consists in representing the emergence of an operational difference. What is introduced is not yet thought, language, or consciousness, but an elemental form of alterity. Where previously only continuity was represented, there now appears the possibility of distinguishing between a proper condition and a non-proper condition.

Expressed elementally, life introduces the possibility of distinguishing between this and not-this. Interior and exterior, preservation and loss, proper and non-proper constitute particular expressions of the same formal relation. Alterity thus appears as a minimal formal condition for representing the living organism.

It is important to note that, in classical logic, both expressions are equivalent:

$P \rightarrow P \equiv P \vee \neg P$

The equivalence does not eliminate the conceptual difference between both models. Its relevance consists precisely in demonstrating that the emergence of alterity does not require abandoning the initial formal substrate. Material continuity and life can be represented within the same logical framework even when they express different conditions.

The decisive difference resides in the explicit presence of negation. In $P \rightarrow P$, no alternative term appears. In $P \vee \neg P$, by contrast, negation introduces a relationship of alterity. This does not entail the appearance of a second reality or a substance opposed to the first. Negation does not designate an autonomous entity. Its function consists in representing the possibility of an internal difference. In this sense, negation functions here as a formal operator of differentiation rather than as the designation of a distinct ontological domain.

The proposed distinction does not intend to constitute a physical theory of matter or an exhaustive biological theory of life. Its function is strictly metatheoretical. The objective consists in introducing a logical model capable of representing the emergence of alterity as a minimal condition for vital phenomena. From this point forward, it will be possible to address progressively more complex configurations while maintaining the same formal substrate.

$P \rightarrow P$ and $P \vee \neg P$ constitute, therefore, two logical models designed to represent different conditions. The first formalizes a material continuity in which difference does not appear explicitly incorporated; the second represents the emergence of an operational alterity characteristic of the living. The relevance of this distinction exceeds the mere characterization of both domains. Its function consists in establishing the minimal formal substrate from which more complex relations can subsequently be modeled, including those involved in the metatheoretical difference that determines what is the conscious and what is the unconscious.

Consciousness as Taxonomic Logic

Consciousness preserves the logical model introduced by the emergence of life. If life can be formally represented by the formula $P \vee \neg P$, it is because it incorporates alterity as a constitutive condition. Consciousness neither modifies this principle nor introduces a different logic; on the contrary, it constitutes one of its most highly developed expressions.

From a metatheoretical perspective, every living organism must establish some form of differential relationship with its surroundings. Even in its most elemental forms, perception implies a translation of material continuity into differentiated registers. This does not yet involve concepts or elaborate categories, but it does entail an extraction process. In this sense, perception constitutes an elemental form of abstraction: it transforms the continuity of the environment into differences capable of acquiring relevance for the organism.

The importance of this observation lies in the fact that consciousness does not appear as a faculty added to perception after the fact. Rather, both participate in the same logical operation. Where the material continuum admits no internal differentiations, perception produces a primary discontinuity, distinguishing aspects of the environment that acquire relevance for the organism. Consciousness inscribes itself within this very same differential logic.

As Solms Notes:

“Consciousness in its elemental form, namely raw feeling, is a surprisingly simple function” [20].

The simplicity of primary consciousness is entirely compatible with this formulation. It is unnecessary to presuppose the initial existence of complex concepts or advanced intellectual operations. It is sufficient that what has been differentiated can establish itself as a register. Feelings, images, and perceptions represent distinct modalities through which the differences introduced by life acquire organization and stability.

Memory acquires a decisive importance here. Without some form of persistence, each perception would remain isolated, rendering it unable to establish relations with other experiences. The conservation of such differences allows for the constitution

of relatively stable classifications and, with it, the emergence of increasingly complex configurations of the environment.

Consciousness must therefore be understood as the logical domain in which the extractions produced by perception acquire sufficient stability to constitute classifications. Its taxonomic character does not stem from the introduction of a new logic, but from operating in accordance with the same binary model that characterizes life. In this sense, conscious logic can also be represented by the formula $P \vee \neg P$, since every classification implies the possibility of distinguishing between a determination and that which is excluded by it. Whether dealing with feelings, images, or concepts, the various productions of consciousness are organized according to this logic of difference—a necessary condition for anything to be identified, named, and related to other determinations.

Abstraction is not a subsequent stage that follows consciousness; it is an inherent property of consciousness itself. Every perception already presupposes an elemental abstraction, insofar as it transforms a continuity into a difference. However, in the human case, this capacity achieves a unique development. Classifications cease to depend exclusively on the immediate situation and can operate upon relations, correlations, and substitutions between variables. The decisive aspect does not lie in the mere utilization of tools or the observable complexity of certain behaviors, but in the possibility of reorganizing the classifications themselves through abstract operations.

The world experienced by the organism thus ceases to present itself solely as a succession of stimuli and begins to be organized through relatively stable categories. Consciousness constitutes precisely the logical register in which these differentiations can be conserved, ordered, and articulated with one another. Its metatheoretical importance lies in the fact that it provides the formal model through which the differences opened by life can acquire organization, stability, and the capacity for abstraction.

The Unconscious as the Incorporation of Possibility

From this perspective, conscious logic preserves the binary model introduced by life and represented by $P \vee \neg P$. The difference does not reside in a modification of said logic, but rather in the scope of the organizations that can be constituted from it. However, this model does not differ substantially from that which guides instinctive behavior in the rest of the animal kingdom. For the conscious register to take place, abstraction is indispensable, and in a strict sense, every perception already constitutes an elemental form of abstraction. Perception implies a translation: it transforms the material continuity of the environment into differentiated sensory registers. In that exact operation, the organism separates itself from the environment and, simultaneously, separates aspects of the continuum by converting them into perceptible stimuli.

In the human case, however, this operation acquires a distinctive complexity. Adaptive success no longer depends exclusively on adjusting to the environment, but increasingly involves the capacity to reorganize it through abstractions, symbols, and artificial constructions. In other words, where a large part of evolutionary history is dominated by adaptation to the environment, in the human case, the capacity to adapt the environment to previously conceived purposes begins to take center stage. In this sense: “el ser humano —con claras desventajas adaptativas desde el punto de vista anatómico— logró sobreponerse mediante la creación de un ecosistema artificial. El modelo biológico fue desplazado

por un modelo lógico: el organismo ya no responde únicamente a presiones ambientales, sino a operaciones de abstracción, mediación simbólica y construcción cultural” [19].

The difference does not reside simply in the transformation of the medium as such. Various species actively modify their environment, and some even produce alterations of considerable complexity. Neither does it lie exclusively in the utilization of tools. The decisive factor is that, in the human case, the material conditions through which a specific objective is achieved cease to be completely determined beforehand. The dams built by beavers, for example, depend on certain specific conditions of execution—a watercourse, available trees, specific characteristics of the terrain. In contrast, the human being can pursue the same end through heterogeneous materials, procedures, or strategies, and even produce the necessary conditions when they are not initially available. The determining factor is no longer the particular adaptive response, but the possibility of substituting one determination for another while conserving the pursued function. This transformation implies a modification in the logical model through which the organism relates to the world. Where the binary logic of the living organizes the environment through discriminations, the unconscious incorporates a new dimension: possibility. The decisive factor is no longer solely that something occurs or does not occur, but that it can be otherwise. Reality ceases to constitute a closed set of empirical determinations and becomes a field susceptible to reorganization.

The importance of this modification was noticed early on by Freud. Far from identifying the psychic with consciousness, he maintained:

“Das Psychische an sich, was immer seine Natur sein mag, ist unbewusst, wahrscheinlich von ähnlicher Art wie alle anderen Vorgänge in der Natur, von denen wir Kenntnis gewonnen haben” [21].

The formulation is especially relevant because it situates the unconscious at the very core of the psychic. The unconscious does not constitute a secondary region or a subsequent addition to the mind, but a constitutive condition of its functioning. This same orientation was subsequently recognized by Solms and Turnbull when noting:

“The aim of psychoanalysis then became to develop a method, and ultimately to derive from that method a theory (and a therapy), that would enable science to explore and understand the dynamic nature and unconscious structure of the mind” [22].

From a metatheoretical point of view, the specificity of the unconscious does not lie in containing hidden representations or in constituting a reservoir of repressed contents. Its uniqueness consists in introducing possibility as a logical category. As was proposed in a previous work:

“es posible definir lógicamente al inconsciente como la instancia que incorpora lo posible como categoría cuya continuidad es inespecífica, infinita y caótica” [23].

Whereas life introduced alterity through $P \vee \neg P$, the unconscious introduces a further transformation: the incorporation of possibility as an organizing principle in its own right. This transformation does not merely expand the binary logic of alterity but opens a domain in which determinations can be reorganized beyond the constraints of immediate empirical classifications. This implies a rupture with respect to the tautological continuity represented by

$P \rightarrow P$. As was developed in *Álgebra del inconsciente*:

“El inconsciente implica la negación del continuo tautológico, la destrucción de la totalidad empírica, la *Widerspruchlosigkeit* de la que hablaba Freud. Formalmente, $\neg(P \rightarrow P)$ ” [23].

The logic of the unconscious is represented by the formula $P \wedge \neg P$. This formalization does not express a consequence derived from the negation of the *continuum*, but the logical model of a different condition. While the material *continuum* can only be reconstructed retrospectively through the formula $P \rightarrow P$ and life incorporates a binary logic represented by $P \vee \neg P$, the unconscious introduces a rupture with respect to both models by incorporating possibility as a constitutive category. The formula $P \wedge \neg P$ precisely represents this opening: the incorporation of the variable, of potentiality, and of indetermination as conditions proper to psychic activity.

This formulation must not be interpreted as a contradiction in the classical sense. Freud described this characteristic through the concept of *Widerspruchlosigkeit*. Rather than an absence of contradiction, it designates the absence of the category of contradiction itself. The unconscious does not operate through mutually exclusive oppositions; it constitutes the logical domain in which determinations can be correlated, displaced, and reorganized without being constrained by the classificatory boundaries imposed by immediate experience.

The importance of this rupture is decisive. Thanks to it, the world ceases to present itself exclusively as a determined empirical reality and simultaneously acquires an abstract and representational dimension. The human being continues to inhabit the same material world as the rest of organisms and remains subjected to the same biological restrictions; however, the human being no longer relates to it solely through empirical determinations, but also through possibilities, equivalences, symbols, and abstract constructions. The incorporation of the possible allows for the correlation of heterogeneous elements, the establishment of substitutions, and the production of new forms of organization that exceed the restrictions of immediate experience. Upon this foundation, symbolization, language, and all subsequent abstract production become possible.

For this reason, consciousness and the unconscious must not be understood as independent faculties or as separate domains of psychic life. Freud was explicit in this regard:

“Wir halten jetzt die Frage nach dem Verhältnis des Bewussten zum Psychischen für erledigt: Das Bewusstsein ist nur eine — überdies inconstante — Qualität (Eigenschaft) des Psychischen. Wir haben uns noch gegen eine Einwendung zu verwehren, die uns sagt, es sei ungeachtet der erwähnten Tatsachen nicht notwendig, die Identität des Bewussten mit dem Psychischen aufzugeben. Die sogenannten unbewussten psychischen Vorgänge seien eben die längst zugestandenen organischen Parallel Vorgänge des Seelischen” [21].

Consciousness and the unconscious constitute, thus, simultaneous expressions of the same psychic activity. From the perspective developed here, no psychic event can be adequately described through the exclusive operation of only one of these logics. Both maintain a relationship of *Wechselwirkung*: they limit, complement, and reciprocally determine each other. Consciousness provides taxonomic stability; the unconscious introduces possibility. The former organizes differences; the latter enables new correlations. Far from mutually excluding each other, both logics are inherent

to one another.

The coexistence of both logics also manifests in the representational nature of human experience. As Solms and Turnbull point out: “the human mental apparatus (if functioning normally) delivers remarkably effective capabilities for perceptually guided locomotion, action, navigation, attentional selection, object identification, and object recognition. However, the fact that the perceptual systems offer only representations of the world can readily be demonstrated by the remarkable errors seen in visual illusions, as well as in psychotic hallucinations and dreams” [22].

The observation is especially relevant because it underlines the representational character of conscious experience. It is worth noting, however, that the expression “functioning normally” introduces a normative reference that the present work does not adopt. From the perspective developed here, the difference between ordinary perception, illusion, dream, or psychotic production does not establish an opposition between normal and abnormal functioning, but distinct modalities of articulation between conscious and unconscious logics. Beyond this precision, the central observation of Solms and Turnbull remains compatible with the present development: human experience does not provide direct access to the world, but organized representations of it.

From Metapsychology to Psychoanalytic Metatheory

The necessity to formalize these processes was recognized by Solms and Turnbull when stating:

“we can never directly know the mind itself. We must therefore have recourse to abstractions derived from inferences and built into figurative models: metapsychology” [22].

The present investigation shares this methodological concern, although it adopts a different orientation. Metapsychology seeks to describe mechanisms, processes, and dynamic relations of the psychic apparatus; metatheory, conversely, endeavors to make explicit the logical conditions that make those mechanisms possible. The difference between both perspectives is not one of content, but of level of analysis. Where metapsychology studies the functioning of the psychic apparatus, metatheory occupies itself with the logical scaffolding that renders that functioning possible. In other words, the relationship between the two is analogous to that existing between an inference rule and a meta theorem that makes explicit the conditions of validity under which said rule operates.

In this sense, the present investigation proposes to examine the contribution that psychoanalytic metatheory can offer to the neuroscientific understanding of singularity and creativity. Based on the formalizations developed below, the objective is to explore how the articulation between conscious and unconscious forms of organization may contribute to current discussions concerning the emergence of singularity and creativity. From this perspective, both phenomena will be examined not only as functional properties of complex biological systems, but also as effects of a specific logical organization that simultaneously incorporates classification, possibility, symbolization, and abstraction.

The trajectory developed up to this point allows for the delimitation of the logical framework from which singularity and creativity will be examined next. If consciousness introduces a taxonomic organization of the world through the binary logic represented by $P \vee \neg P$, and if the unconscious incorporates possibility through the logic represented by $P \wedge \neg P$, then both—singularity

and creativity—can be approached as emergent effects of the articulation between these two logics. The question therefore extends beyond how individuals adapt to their environments or regulate their exchanges with them, toward how they generate new forms of organization, new correlations, and new possibilities of relating to what they experience as reality.

Singularity and Creativity

The articulation between consciousness and the unconscious raises a problem that traverses both psychoanalytic theory and contemporary models of neuroscience. If consciousness is organized according to the binary logic represented by $P \vee \neg P$ and the unconscious according to the logic represented by $P \wedge \neg P$, it becomes necessary to explain how both can coexist without producing a permanent disorganization of psychic activity.

The coexistence of these two logics is not a secondary feature of psychic life but one of its constitutive conditions. Consciousness stabilizes experience through classification and differentiation, whereas the unconscious introduces possibility through the correlation of heterogeneous determinations. It is precisely from the articulation between these two modes of organization that singularity and creativity emerge as distinct yet complementary phenomena.

Singularity as the Production of Validity

This question is not merely theoretical. An apparatus incapable of stabilizing such tension would be unable to sustain a coherent organization of psychic activity. The fundamental issue consists, then, in understanding how a psychic organization can simultaneously sustain a logic of classification and a logic of possibility without collapsing under the formal incompatibility that exists between the two.

From highly diverse perspectives, this problem appears repeatedly in the literature. Winnicott formulates it through the opposition between creativity and compliance; Kris through the tension between inspiration and elaboration; Milner through the paradoxical coexistence between the preservation and the suspension of the distinction between self and object; Freud through the various forms of *Kompromißbildung*; Friston through the problem of uncertainty reduction; and Carhart-Harris through the relationship between entropy and the organization of conscious states. Even when the concepts employed differ considerably, they all describe distinct modalities of stabilizing a constitutive tension.

However, the problem can be formulated in a more general manner. The coexistence between conscious and unconscious logic does not constitute an exceptional situation or an occasional perturbation of mental functioning. On the contrary, it represents a permanent condition of psychic activity. Consciousness introduces relatively stable classifications; the unconscious continuously relativizes those classifications through the incorporation of new possibilities, associations, and equivalences. Neither of the two logics can eliminate the other without simultaneously destroying the very conditions of mental functioning.

This condition can be represented by the formula:

$$\vdash ((P \vee \neg P) \leftrightarrow (P \wedge \neg P))$$

The choice of this formulation requires precision. Considered from the standpoint of classical logic, the equivalence between both expressions is anti-valid. There is no possible valuation in

which the formula acquires the value V. Precisely for this reason, the symbol $\vdash$ is decisive. It does not represent an effectively demonstrated derivation or a conclusion reached through deductive reasoning. Rather, it expresses a formal requirement imposed by the functioning of the psychic apparatus itself. The apparatus must operate as if some relation between both logics were possible, even though such a relation cannot be established through a classically valid equivalence. Hence, it represents a requirement of validity.

The psychic apparatus cannot remain indefinitely in indetermination. It must produce some mode of stabilization even when the articulation between the logics that constitute it does not admit a classical logical resolution. The question ceases then to be how to eliminate the tension, and becomes how the distinct forms of stabilization that allow it to be inhabited are produced.

At this point, the observation formulated by Solms regarding the relationship between physiological and psychological processes acquires relevance:

“To ask how objective things produce subjective things is to speak loosely; it risks making the hard problem harder than it needs to be. Objectivity and subjectivity are observational perspectives, not causes and effects. Neurophysiological events can no more produce psychological events than lightning can produce thunder. They are parallel manifestations of a single underlying process” [20].

The importance of this formulation resides in the fact that it allows for the displacement of the problem away from a linear causality between brain and mind toward the description of a single process observed from different perspectives. The issue no longer consists in explaining how the material produces the subjective, but in understanding what the logical conditions are that make the organization of subjective experience possible.

From this perspective, singularity and creativity can be examined as specific modalities of stabilization. They do not constitute anomalies of mental functioning or accessory properties of certain individuals. On the contrary, they represent possible responses to the permanent requirement to produce validity where the articulation between conscious and unconscious logic does not admit a definitive resolution.

The following sections develop this hypothesis by examining how singularity and creativity can be understood as emergent effects of this constitutive condition of the psychic apparatus.

Singularity as the Production of Validity

The requirement of validity represented by the formula:

$$\vdash ((P \vee \neg P) \leftrightarrow (P \wedge \neg P))$$

constitutes a permanent condition of psychic activity. If conscious logic sustains the stability of taxonomies and unconscious logic sustains the incorporation of possibility, countering any definitive stabilization, then the fundamental problem no longer consists in explaining each of these logics separately, but in understanding how they can coexist without producing a permanent disorganization of the psychic apparatus.

This issue is not merely theoretical. An organism incapable of producing some form of stabilization faced with this condition could hardly sustain a continuous experience of the world, nor an organization sufficiently consistent to guarantee its survival. The requirement of validity expressed by $\vdash$ does not represent, then, an effectively achieved logical derivation, but a permanent

requirement to which the psychic apparatus is subjected. It is a matter of producing a solution where no universal resolution is possible.

Singularity arises precisely at this point. It does not constitute an exceptional property of certain individuals, nor an accessory characteristic of personality. Neither does it designate an essence prior to experience, nor a fixed identity that remains unaltered over time. Singularity is a production. More precisely, it is the production of a validity capable of sustaining said tension where no definitive logical resolution is possible.

From this perspective, singularity must not be confused with arbitrariness. The validity that each individual produces is always conditioned by the organic determinations proper to the body, by the relations privileged by cathexis—for instance, in the relationship between the mother and the infant—and by the restrictions imposed by the socio-historical context in which said subjectivity is constituted. Singularity does not withdraw the individual from the world; it constitutes precisely one of the forms through which they can remain within it.

However, neither can it be reduced to a consequence of those conditions. The circumstances surrounding the individual delimit the field within which singularity emerges, but they do not allow it to be derived either causally or teleologically. Individuals exposed to similar conditions, and even subjects who share a large part of their biological and environmental determinations, produce different subjective configurations. Singularity is not arbitrary, but neither is it deducible. It is conditioned without being determined by the conditions that accompany its emergence.

For this reason, singularity can be understood as a form of metastability. It does not constitute a definitive equilibrium or a complete resolution of the tension between conscious and unconscious logics. In the same way that a supersaturated solution can conserve a stability that is merely kinetic but not thermodynamic, singularity maintains a local organization whose persistence depends on a metastable and, for that very reason, essentially fragile equilibrium. Its stability does not consist in the elimination of instability, but in the production of a form of organization capable of transitorily sustaining it.

This characteristic becomes especially visible in the various compromise formations (*Kompromißbildungen*) described by Freud. The symptom constitutes a privileged example. Far from representing a simple failure of psychic functioning, it operates as a singular solution. Its persistence demonstrates precisely that it fulfills a stabilizing function. Even when it generates suffering, it continues to offer a response to a requirement that cannot be eliminated. Singularity does not resolve the tension between consciousness and the unconscious; it renders it habitable.

The importance of this formulation lies in the fact that it shifts the problem from identity to production. The subject does not discover a pre-existing singularity, but rather constructs it continuously through variable forms of stabilization. What is stabilized is not contradiction or possibility as such, but a validity that allows the individual to inhabit a world in which that tension remains locally organized. The *Realitätsprüfung* plays a decisive role here. It does not guarantee the truth of said validity, nor does it convert it into something universal; it guarantees only that it conserves a sufficient articulation with shared reality to sustain the continuity

of experience.

Some of these configurations remain restricted to the subjective economy of the individual. Others, by contrast, acquire an additional capacity: they produce correlations that exceed the strict personal domain and reach the shared world. It is precisely at this point where the problem of creativity emerges.

Creativity as the Production of Correlations

Singularity and creativity share the exact same metatheoretical baseline. Both constitute incalculable productions. This does not mean they are arbitrary, random, or independent of the conditions accompanying their emergence. It means, more precisely, that there is no causal, logical, or teleological chain capable of deriving what they produce. The conditions delimit the field within which they emerge, but they do not permit the anticipation or deduction of the concrete form they will ultimately adopt.

Singularity responds to this condition through the production of a validity. Creativity does so through correlations. In both cases, these are syntheses that cannot be derived from preceding conditions, although, at the very least, they preserve previously instituted correlations and, in their strongest expression, introduce correlations that reorganize the context within which they acquire sense. Both possess the same fundamental character: they are incalculable beforehand.

This characteristic allows us to understand why creativity does not constitute an exceptional faculty reserved for certain individuals, nor a capacity restricted to art, science, or technological innovation. Creativity accompanies all symbolic activity. That being said, symbolic activity does not possess a fixed order by itself. As observed in dreams, it expresses itself according to unconscious logic—that is, according to an articulation that does not respond to binary exclusion or to contradiction as a category. However, such openness does not imply that symbolic activity completely lacks ordering. Subjective constitution is also assembled under conscious binary logic; that is, the possible is traversed and restricted by certain conditions of stabilization whose inscription already takes place from the very beginning of extrauterine life: not all of the body acquires the same value, as demonstrated by the delimitation of erogenous zones; not all experience is cathected in the same manner, for instance, as can be observed, for example, in the temporal inscription between the infant's crying and the mother's response, where a primary modulation between need, waiting, response, and satisfaction is introduced, which is a mode of ordering.

This superposition between disorganization (the possible) and ordering (the stable) is inherent to mental activity. On one hand, unconscious logic permits associations, displacements, equivalences, and correlations that are not subjected beforehand to a stable classification. On the other hand, conscious logic provides the substrate so that specific correlations can acquire taxonomic stability. The synthesis between the two stabilizes into sense. This constitutes the most elemental form through which singular validity acquires consistency.

Sense possesses, then, a dual characteristic: on one hand, it is singular, because it is sustained by a subjective validity; on the other hand, it is universalizing, because it functions as an orderer of the phenomenon. It is not universal in an absolute logical sense, but it operates for the subject as if it introduced a law of organization for the world.

From this perspective, even the most mundane everyday use of language is a manifestation of creativity. Each act of naming presupposes an elemental abstraction of the world and, consequently, the inscription of relationships that do not belong to the material continuum as such, but to the field of sense through which said continuum is experienced. However, this does not mean that the correlation between word and thing is produced anew every single time. In the everyday use of language, creativity operates principally upon already instituted correlations: it conserves, updates, displaces, or reinscribes them into new contexts. At this level, it can be said that sense adapts to the context without modifying the general coordinates through which said context is understood.

Creativity, however, is not exhausted by this general condition. In its most radical expression, the created correlation not only integrates into a previously given context, but forces a reorganization of the very context within which that correlation can acquire sense. It is not a different type of creativity, but the exact same operation deployed to its ultimate consequences. What varies is not the nature of the creative act, but the scope of the transformations it introduces.

The formulation of new scientific theories offers particularly clear examples of this phenomenon. The historical importance of expressions such as $E = mc^2$ does not reside exclusively in the empirical results that contributed to its formulation, but in the reorganization of the conceptual context within which certain problems could be formulated or reinterpreted, certain questions—impossible in the preceding context—could be posed, and specific relationships, previously inexplicable, could acquire sense. Creativity does not alter the material continuum or retrospectively modify the physical conditions of the universe. What it transforms is the field of correlations through which said universe can be understood; it is not merely a change within an already constituted framework, but a dislocation of the framework itself. The novelty does not reside in the modification of a particular correlation, but in the reorganization of the field within which correlations can acquire sense. Within it, sense does not limit itself to adapting to the context; rather, it is the context itself that is adapted to sense.

The produced correlation introduces such a reorganization that previous relationships cease to be sufficient to house it. For this reason, a paradigmatic dislocation does not constitute an exception to creativity, but the extreme manifestation of its internal logic: the capacity to introduce correlations whose existence depends upon their expression and whose appearance cannot be derived either causally or logically from the conditions preceding them.

The adaptive significance of creativity as a paradigmatic dislocation can be observed most clearly in the progressive subordination of biological adaptation to symbolic organizations produced by the species itself. From this perspective, the replacement of natural selection by forms of artificial selection constitutes an archetypal case of paradigmatic dislocation. This solution, which preserves the survival of the species, is not without consequences; the material world is left outside of experience, since it is never experienced except through abstract mediations, yet it is never liberated from the restrictions it imposes. At the same time, inhabiting an abstract (symbolic) world ensures that stability is always relative and transitory, given the fragile metastable nature of its equilibrium.

From this perspective, creativity can be defined as the production or reinscription of correlations whose concrete form cannot be derived either causally or locally from preceding conditions. These correlations do not emerge *ex nihilo* or on the margins of all restriction. Their appearance always depends upon a singular synthesis. However, neither are they contained within the conditions that accompany their emergence. Creativity introduces, conserves, or transforms relationships whose existence depends upon sense and which, once stabilized, modify the field within which other correlations can emerge.

The proximity between this formulation and certain recent developments in neuroscience is evident. Concepts such as the *anarchic brain* describe states in which the habitual restrictions that limit possible associations are relaxed, permitting the appearance of unprecedented configurations. However, the metatheoretical problem posed here does not consist simply in explaining the generation of new associations, but in understanding how specific syntheses acquire sufficient consistency to sustain correlations that could not be derived from prior conditions. The fundamental issue is no longer the mere variability of possible states, but the emergence of a singular organization capable of instituting new forms of sense.

Creativity does not constitute an exception to sense, but rather one of its fundamental properties. However, sense is not constantly reinvented because it operates simultaneously as a principle of stabilization for the abstract world. In the same way that homeostasis preserves biological organization, sense preserves symbolic organization. The mind does not pursue homeostasis as an ultimate purpose; it functions supported by the metastable equilibrium of sense. Creativity emerges precisely from the tension between both conditions: the preservation of already instituted correlations and the permanent possibility of establishing new correlations.

The relevance of this formulation can be observed with total clarity in situations where sense collapses. *Grief* constitutes a particularly illustrative example. In these cases, there is no uncertainty regarding the event itself. The loss is known with absolute certainty. However, the organization of sense that permitted the integration of that relationship within experience is profoundly altered. What becomes uncertain is not the fact, but the set of correlations through which that fact was interpreted. The question ceases to be what has occurred and is transformed into *how can one continue to inhabit a world whose organization of sense has disintegrated*. In other words, the certainty of the event does not eliminate suffering because what collapses is not the knowledge of the fact, but the correlations through which it ceases to be integrated into the organization of sense that previously sustained the context.

This observation carries important consequences for the understanding of psychic activity. Empirical certainty can coexist with a radical uncertainty regarding sense. Subjective disorganization does not necessarily arise from the absence of information or from the impossibility of predicting future events. It can also arise from the collapse of the correlations that sustained a specific organization of sense within experience. Under such circumstances, the fundamental task of the psychic apparatus does not consist simply in reducing uncertainty, but, in the best-of-cases scenario, in producing new validities and new correlations capable of reconstructing a habitable world;

otherwise, the equilibrium of sense—and even homeostatic equilibrium—becomes compromised.

Creativity and singularity appear thus as two complementary expressions of the exact same condition. Singularity invents the individual through the production of a validity. Creativity invents the context through correlations. Both respond to the permanent requirement of validity represented by:

$$\vdash ((P \vee \neg P) \leftrightarrow (P \wedge \neg P))$$

and both constitute attempts—always partial and metastable—to inhabit a condition that does not admit a definitive logical resolution. The fundamental question, then, no longer consists in determining how absolute stability is achieved, but in understanding how an abstract world, whose organization is never definitively guaranteed, can be kept habitable.

Discussion

The preceding developments allow for a reconsideration of the problem of psychic stability from a fundamentally different perspective. Diverse neuroscientific approaches have tended to interpret mental activity in terms of regulation, adaptation, and the preservation of relatively stable conditions of functioning. From this viewpoint, phenomena such as uncertainty reduction or functional convergence constitute highly valuable explanatory tools for understanding specific aspects of cerebral organization.

However, this work posits that psychic stability cannot be reduced exclusively to such processes. The tension between conscious and unconscious logics neither disappears nor can it be definitively resolved. On the contrary, it remains active in all subjective production. The psychic apparatus does not eliminate this tension; it produces configurations of sense capable of rendering it habitable.

The symptom constitutes a privileged example of this dynamic. Far from representing an anomaly or a dysfunction, it must be understood as a singular solution that does not resolve the underlying tension but preserves a minimal organization of sense. Its principal function consists not in eliminating tension, but in preventing the subjective disintegration that could otherwise result from it. The persistence of painful, costly, or apparently irrational symptoms demonstrates that psychic activity is not oriented exclusively toward criteria of efficiency or adaptation. Rather, it brings to light the massive psychic labor implied in sustaining configurations of sense whose loss would compromise the very possibility of inhabiting the world.

These observations also allow for a reconsideration of the relationship between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. According to Solms and Turnbull:

“in our opinion, the interface between psychoanalysis and neuroscience is a rather dialectical one. As analysts, we may learn something new about the brain that seems relevant to psychoanalysis. We may think about it, keep it at the back of our minds, entertain the possibility, but above all test it psychoanalytically, as well as investigate its clinical usefulness. In this way, the final court of appeal for psychoanalysis remains the psychoanalytic setting—psychoanalytic observations made on real human beings, in the conventional clinical situation” [22].

The present investigation coincides with the necessity for a dialogue between both fields, although it proposes to situate this exchange on a different plane. The issue consists not merely in

establishing correspondence between clinical observations and neural mechanisms. It consists, furthermore, in recognizing that both disciplines operate upon distinct and complementary scales of analysis.

Neuroscience studies regularities, observable correlations, and biological mechanisms of functioning. Psychoanalysis, by contrast, constitutes the only discipline in which singularity is not merely an object of study, but the very condition guiding its clinical practice. This is true not only because it deals with concrete subjects, but because every subjective production, every session, and every clinical construction are considered irreducibly singular. This methodological difference does not establish a hierarchy between the two perspectives; on the contrary, it allows us to comprehend how they can complement each other.

From the perspective of the psychoanalytic metatheory developed in this work, singularity does not constitute an exception to functional regularities, nor a residual anomaly of systems oriented toward adaptation. It constitutes an inherent dimension of human psychic life. At this juncture, the potential contribution of psychoanalysis to neuroscience consists not in correcting its empirical findings, but in broadening the scope of the problems that can be formulated based on them.

Conclusion

The purpose of this work has not been to question the existence of phenomena such as functional convergence, homeostasis, or uncertainty reduction. All of them describe highly relevant aspects of biological and neuronal organization. Certain patterns of brain activity can be studied statistically; diverse neural networks can be correlated with specific tasks; distinct processes of functional convergence can be observed experimentally.

Nevertheless, the trajectory traced in this study suggests that an additional dimension remains to be accounted for. Functional convergence describes how certain configurations achieve stability. What remains open is the question regarding the *validity* of those singular configurations through which a subject organizes sense, sustains a subjective position, or produces new correlations capable of reorganizing their experience and their context.

Creativity and singularity cease then to appear as peripheral or exceptional problems. They constitute inherent conditions of the specifically human way of inhabiting an abstract world whose organization is never definitively guaranteed. The constitutive fragility of sense converts both into central problems for understanding mental life.

From this perspective, the specific contribution of psychoanalytic metatheory consists in providing a conceptual framework for singularity, a dimension that is not typically the primary object of models centered on functional regularities. Where neuroscience permits the description of operating conditions, correlations, and mechanisms, psychoanalytic metatheory allows for the conceptualization of the singular forms through which validity, sense, and creativity are produced.

Precisely within this articulation between regularity and singularity resides one of the most significant points of convergence between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. This is not because both disciplines study the exact same object, but because they occupy themselves with complementary dimensions of a single reality.

Beyond Functional Convergence does not imply abandoning functional convergence, but rather recognizing that the comprehension of human experience requires the incorporation of an additional dimension. Where functional convergence allows us to understand how certain organizations achieve stability, psychoanalytic metatheory provides a framework for examining how singular configurations of sense emerge and how creativity introduces new correlations capable of reorganizing those configurations. Such configurations cannot be reduced exclusively to adaptive mechanisms, functional optimization, or uncertainty reduction. In this sense, creativity and singularity cease to occupy a marginal position and become central problems for a broader and more rigorous understanding of mental life.

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